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ABSTRACT
There are a number of factors that impact a digital forensics investigation. These factors include: the
digital media in question, implemented processes and methodologies, the legal aspects, and the
individuals involved in the investigation. This paper presents the initial idea that Digital Forensic
Practice (DFP) recommendations can potentially improve how organizations handle digital evidence.
The recommendations are derived from an in-depth survey conducted with practitioners in both
commercial organizations and law enforcement along with supporting literature.
The
recommendations presented in this paper can be used to assess an organization’s existing digital
forensics practices and a guide to Digital Forensics Improvement Initiatives.
Keywords: first responder; forensic readiness; organizations; procedures; digital evidence; Digital
Forensic Practice.
1. INTRODUCTION
The digital revolution has profoundly affected how both private and law enforcement organizations
handle digital evidence. With the increase of globalization and the advancing nature of technology,
criminals are targeting digital media as well as using them as a tool to conduct crimes [2].
Organizations underestimate how often they will be subject to one of these attacks and how often they
will have to produce reliable evidence to present in court [14]. Therefore, it is becoming increasingly
important to identify potential weaknesses and rectify them [14]. Hence, digital forensic practices and
the handling of digital evidence is an issue which is pertinent to many organizations throughout the
world. Within the course of a year, the average organization will encounter events such as
unauthorized access to the computer system, computer based attacks (e.g. phishing or denial of
service), or online defamation [5]. In a study conducted by the Home Office in 2004 [8], organizations
identified 101 different types of criminal threats administered by 137 different technological methods.
The participants in the Home Office research study included Information Technology Security, Law
Enforcement, Academic and Governmental organizations with a range of experience over a variety of
security oriented topics [8].
With the exponential growth in technological advances and their utilization for criminal end, one
might expect these figures to be higher in 2009. The criminal threat categories delineated in the Home
Office study demonstrates the array of knowledge necessary to investigate potential violations. An act
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such as fraud would be considered an offence under the Fraud Act 2006 (England) and could, if
successfully prosecuted, lead to 10 years imprisonment [4]. Should an offence like this occur during
the course of business and the discoverer (herein after referred to as the ‘first responder’) is untrained
in the handling of digital materials, vital evidence could be lost or compromised, and a prosecution
may not be secured. Incidences of money laundering and child pornography can be the most
problematic for the organizations, as untrained first responders can inadvertently taint the evidence.
These two particular crimes are the only ones which organizations are obligated, in the United
Kingdom (UK), to report to the police [2].
Ueli Maurer discusses, in relation to Digital Rights Management (DRM), the importance of technical,
legal, social and business aspects when managing information and information technology systems
[7]. Highlighting these four criteria is useful for the examination of digital evidence. During the
aforementioned discovery scenario, the relationship between the technology and the first responder is
inseparable and, therefore, interdependent. The problematic technological discovery and subsequent
evidence recovery is solely reliant on the first responder’s action and the complexity of the
technological discovery will affect who has the skills to correctly handle the situation. Implementation
of protocols must take into account the culture of the organization, policies and laws applicable to the
type of information handled, as well as the size and nature of the organization.
This paper summarizes the results of an initial UK Organizational survey that examines how
institutions handle digital evidence when it is discovered by untrained first responders. The results of
the survey established the initial justification for Digital Forensic Practice (DFP) recommendations.
These recommendations are based on the small sample of individuals interviewed for this research and
cannot encompass every type of organisation. The purpose of this study is to initiate discussion
surrounding issues that arise within organisations where there is currently no standardised set of
protocols in place to protect the integrity of digital evidence.
2. EXISTING RELEVANT WORK
There are three major areas that should be addressed when considering the significance of digital
evidence becoming tainted by an untrained first responder: legal aspects including admissibility; the
forensic readiness of the organization; and the first responder themselves. This paper will not
concentrate on the legal aspects as these are jurisdictional and will vary both nationally and
internationally. The latter problems, however, will be briefly discussed in order to contextualise the
research and its value.
2.1 Forensic Readiness
Forensic readiness is a concept outlined by Robert Rowlingson from QinetiQ Ltd, an internationally
recognised defence technology and security consultancy [15]. From the perspective of law
enforcement agencies the forensic process begins when the crime has been committed or it has been
discovered and reported. The concept of forensic readiness, according to Rowlingson, is that an
organization can pre-empt the occurrence of a crime by gathering evidence in advance and in doing
this, organizations will benefit not only in instances where prosecution becomes an issue but also in
limiting their own business risks [13]. Although this definition of the forensic readiness strategy acts
as the primary thesis of Rowlingson’s paper, he addresses other matters of benefit and contention.
These are identified below and in Section 2.2.
One of the main strengths of the forensic readiness model is the recognition of the range of personnel
within an organization who can become involved in a legal inquiry and this is something that will be
critiqued in Section 2.1.3. Rowlingson identifies no less than eleven different departments and their
associated personnel that must be considered in an investigation.
Although the variety of staff involved will vary depending upon the magnitude of the investigation,
this observation identifies the crux of this paper’s argument – there are a multitude of people who need
to understand the correct protocol within a digital investigation.
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2.2 First Responder: Policies
Forensic readiness may be implemented as an organization, but when evidence is discovered the
strength or weakness of that evidence is reliant on the first responder and their actions [6]. The United
States Department of Justice (USDoJ), in their first responder’s guide, defines a first responder, in a
digital evidence context, as:



Anyone encountering a crime scene that might contain electronic evidence;



Anyone processing a crime scene that involves electronic evidence;



Anyone supervising someone who processes such a crime scene;



Anyone managing an organization that processes such a crime scene [9].

This means that there is a desire to be forensically ready within the organization and in relation to
evidence gathering, but also there is a need for forensic readiness amongst all members of staff.
Many organizations implement incident readiness through company policies. However, given the
complexity of digital forensics, the expectation of staff members to understand both technical and
legal principles is unreasonable based on other areas of expertise that the employee may possess.
Reliance on policies is the downfall of Rowlingson’s forensic readiness implementation as a high level
of expectation of technical knowledge is forced upon the average user. Relying on this knowledge for
the purposes of digital security, particularly in the context of evidence collection, is completely
unacceptable. A notable example of unreasonable expectation within current digital security literature
is David Harley’s article focusing on the problem of phishing attacks. Harley makes a number of
strong remarks regarding what comprises phishing, the pitfalls of the average user and methods by
which phishing scams can be educated against and defeated. From the perspective of this paper,
however, the major downfall of his proposed solutions comes from the relationship between
technological indicators and the untrained end user, or first responder in the context of this research.
He expects the average user to identify security cues such as accessing the HTML source code to
verify the legitimacy of the senders email address; Domain Name Service (DNS) misdirection; and
identification of deceptive embedded Universal Resource Locators (URL’s) – activities many users
would be unable to undertake regardless of their desire to act more securely [3]. Harley’s paper, by no
means, disregards less-technically capable individuals, as he proposes quizzes to simplify the issues.
His paper does, however, act as a useful baseline by which “simple” technological cues can be
measured and, when contextualised to an untrained first responder, it becomes apparent why this
dichotomy can become problematic for the field of digital forensics.
Regardless of the technical knowledge requirements outlined, policies are problematic at a very basic
level. The complexity of jargon and the expectation to read and understand complicated ideas,
concepts and rules leads to the insecure behavior demonstrated when policies are presented to many
employees – they sign the documents without reading them [16]. Julie Nosworthy identifies some of
the key downfalls of a policy culture including the tension between technological solutions and the
human factor [10]. She identifies the failings previously indicated with regards to a lack of
understanding of external departmental issues, specifically in relation to Human Resources (HR) and
Information Security (IS) [10].
2.3 First Responders: Automated Tools
In order to fully explore the various tools currently utilised within the realm of first response, it is
important to address automated solutions as well as more human-driven techniques previously
discussed, such as policies. These will not play a particular role within the Digital Forensic Practices
recommended in Section 4.0, but are beneficial for background understanding of the problems and
solutions. FRED is a tool used by the American Air Force Office of Special Investigations and its
objective is to handle digital evidence without the intervention of any users [6]. The goal of the actual
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FRED tool is to determine whether or not an intrusion had occurred by means of analysis of network
connections, active processes, dynamic link libraries (DLL) and open ports with MD5 hash values
recorded for critical files on the system [6]. Furthermore, the entire tool fits onto a CDROM and the
disk would play host to a batch file created by the tool to create an audit trail [6].
Ideally, an automated tool would remove responsibility from the first responder and allow unified
evidence collection regardless of their specific knowledge. It could be argued that on these grounds the
aforementioned criticism of policies and their unreasonable expectations placed upon the user are
circumvented. However, an automated tool does not remove the human factors from the acquisition
process and therefore there is still scope for data to become compromised. An individual will be
required to insert the disk and execute the tool. How can it be determined what they did to the
computer before the auditing tool began its work? Depending on the size of the system the tool may
take some time to complete its functions. What happens if the first responder leaves the room while
the tools is executing? There is scope for a suspect or bystander to compromise the tool while it is in
operation and issues surrounding the field of live forensics which are outwith the scope of this paper.
Some of these issues are addressed in the conclusion on Kornblum’s article where it is indicated that:
“There have been some procedural questions regarding when FRED should be run and by whom,
but these are issues of policy, not technology” [6].
This harks back to Nosworthy’s analysis of the problematic areas of policy making where a ‘them and
us’ culture exists [10]. The technological implementations in this scenario cannot exist without the
human factor and it is, therefore, unacceptable to blame any shortcomings on the individuals who are
required to make the whole system operate correctly.
3. SURVEY COMPILATION
The study attempts to investigate whether or not the individuals in charge of implementing policies
and dealing with the implications of digital evidence handling have a sufficient understanding of the
issues and the practices within the field. The following sub-sections present the experimental approach
and demographic information.
3.1 Methodology
The style for this case study was a combination of both structured and semi-structured interviews.
Structured interviews have a specific set of questions which are presented to each interviewee and,
upon answering the questions, the interviewer moves to the next question or set of questions. Semistructured interviews begin with a broad set of themes to be discussed and the responses from the
interviewee will lead the direction of the interview and generate new lines of questioning [12]. The
case study questions were pre-defined and were split into two main thematic groups: policies and
general issues, together with technical issues for the organizational questions; organizational evidence
and technical issues for the law enforcement questions. The same sets of questions were asked of each
individual interviewee. Where their responses afforded the opportunity, further questioning along
these lines was followed to gain as much information as possible.
The organizational survey questions were initially validated by an individual who not only possesses
corporate environment work experience but has also undertaken research projects at the University
level. An ex-senior police officer was approached to validate the law enforcement questions in a
similar manner. Both of these validations led to minor adjustments being made to the questions to
clarify semantic ambiguities. For example, prior to the validation process, one question read: “How is
this communicated to all staff?” This was changed to “How is this communicated to all staff within
the organization?” in an attempt to mitigate ambiguity for the interviewee.
Prior to distributing the questions and in addition to the initial validation procedure, individuals who
were not due to participate, but yet had relevant background knowledge, were asked to validate the
questions to ensure they were easily understood by the target audience. This was done at the
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recruitment stage for the organization questions. After ascertaining that an individual was not
appropriate for the research project due to their lack of daily contact with the subject matter, they were
asked to explain their understanding of each question to ensure that their understanding matched the
interview intention.
3.1.1 Interview Demographics
A total of ten interviewees were recruited based initially on two broad areas concerned with digital
evidence, i.e., organizations and law enforcement. Within these categories a balance was sought
between public/government organizations, corporate organizations and educational institutions. A
balance was also sought between the organizational sides and the police, lawyer and ‘other’ (such as
private investigator) for the law enforcement side. Table 1 provides a detailed insight into the survey
participant’s organizations, years of experience and job title.
TABLE 1
Interviewee
Key
A1
HB1
HB2
F1
F2
F3
F4
CS1
DE1

Type of
Organization
Academic
Health Board
Health Board
Financial
Financial
Financial
Financial
Civil Servant
Digital Examiner

Years
Experience.
Undisclosed
24
11
5
8
18
4
10
4

Occupation
Information Security Coordinator
Head of Information Governance
Information Governance Technical Advisor
Security and Technical Consultant
Internal Audit Manager
Divisional Records Officer
Information Security Manager
Procurator Fiscal
Digital Analyst for a Private Company

The intention behind seeking the balance among the various categories was to gain an objective
understanding of issues addressed by organizations and those which are distinctive to law enforcement
agencies in order to identify areas of correlation and anomalies. Due to the separation between
organizations and law enforcement interviewees, two different sets of interview questions were posed
to participants depending on their respective associations. The individual questions are available upon
request.
3.2 Results
The survey findings identified the following four areas as areas that need to be discussed:
¾
¾
¾
¾

Problems identified by the organizations surrounding digital security
Current first responder practices
Issues surrounding communication and training
Variables identified by the organizations that act as unique difficulties or points of note.

3.2.1 Problems identified by the organizations surrounding digital security
When interviewees were asked to identify the type of attacks, crimes or general issues which are
problematic within their organization, the following were acknowledged:



Theft of physical objects including hardware



Loss or the need for encryption of USB keys



Implementing security measures that only addressed external attacks rather than

37

ADFSL Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law, 2010
considering the internal threats


First response errors



Warning colleagues of digital device seizure or search



Unauthorized access to data



Emails including spam and viruses



Phishing attacks on customers and staff



Making copies of child pornography for the purpose of examinations



Malicious malware



Personal use of the organization’s system (e.g. via photographs and music)



Identity theft



Human error



Password complacency.

Although there were overlaps in the problems identified by the interviewees, this list demonstrates
that, within a relatively small interviewee group, a vast range of different problems encountered has
been identified. This supports the aforementioned critique of automated first response tools - how can
an automated tool be expected to handle such a range of subjective issues and cope with human error?
Some of these problems can be automatically handled, such as malicious malware or email problems,
but many of the issues facing digital security exist in a non-digital medium. For example, HB2
identified unauthorized access of digital patient records to be a problem within their health board. He
commented that people access data that they are not supposed to access because “people are nosey”.
Although access control software could help prevent this problem, determining what is an act of
curiosity and what is a genuine access of confidential records is a subjective issue which cannot be
determined by automation. HB1 reinforced this point, saying that:
“You can put as many procedures and policies in place and you can put as many technical
measures in place but there is this big grey area in the middle with people in it and they’ll always
let you down.”
In terms of policies, interviewees often agreed with the critique outlined in Section 2.2 First
Responder: Policies regarding the unreasonable expectation of individuals to understand technical
problems. It was, however, noted by F3 and F1 that often leaving the level of education at a basic
awareness level is safer for the company’s interest. F3 commented that:
“Personally, I feel that staff don’t need to know the details of digital security, they need to know it
at a high level and the importance of it but we would tend to leave that to subject matter experts
who are dealing with it on a daily basis…There is a risk that if too many people know too much
detail there is potential for something to happen.”
F1 concurred saying “the less they know the better for us”. There is a conflict existing here because
much of the literature suggests that the only way for individuals to take digital security seriously is to
fully understand why they are taking certain actions rather than a different set of actions [10]. F1 and
F3 acknowledge that it is often safer to restrict the amount of knowledge staff have regarding digital
security, but there is a limit to the amount of information that can be discretionary and a point in which
it will restrict the awareness of issues.
This is a notable conflict of interests between those implementing the security and the end-users and
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there were other such incompatibilities identified through the interviews which will be discussed in
Section 3.2.3 Issues surrounding communication and training.
3.2.2 Current first responder practices
One of the most conspicuous blanket practices amongst all of the organizations was how to deal with a
first responder discovery of evidence on the organization’s system. Every individual in the
organization category of interviewees details a policy involving a phone call to another department
should an end-user discover something that could potentially be used as evidence. The interesting
aspect arises from the fact that each organization suggested contacting a different person. Even
individuals within the same organization, in different roles, identified different departments that
should be contacted. These included:



Local I.T. support



Legal



Help-lines



Financial Crime



Line Manager.

F3 and F2 are employed by the same financial institution within different areas of the team. F3
identified the legal department as the point of contact whereas F2 suggested the financial crime
department. This anomaly could have arisen through their differing roles and within their specific role
or the type of information they frequently handle, then these departments may be the most suitable.
The most striking aspect about the response to this question, across the board, is that there is no
definitive standard regarding what end-users should do upon discovery of potential evidence.
However, all the organizations provided their staff access to policies regarding general digital security
via their intranet or equivalent. The potential problem with this system is addressed in Section 4.1 Do
not use the intranet for policies regarding the handling of digital evidence.
The impact of not using the intranet for policy dissemination, from the law enforcement perspective,
varied between DE1 and CS1. DE1 identified instances where he had been called to an organization
and upon arrival the requesting member of staff was still on the computer and eager to show him
information they had found. He explained to the individual that:
“her activity on the computer was going to result inevitably in the loss of recoverable information
that could have been useful…from there onwards you’re not looking at the computer that the
suspect used…all I was looking at was how her boss was using the computer”
He did, however, explain that this was a small company and perhaps this could account for the method
in which it was reported and handled. CS1 explained that the difference in resources and capabilities
between large and small organizations often results in different methods of handling and reporting.
This, and similar incidents are often reported to a private investigator, perhaps not exclusively but in
part, because of the size of the company as smaller organizations are more likely to circumvent any of
their own departments and hand the information directly to the police or investigators. Larger
companies, CS1 continues, would just sack the individual to avoid reputational damage. On the
whole, however, CS1 did not feel the reliability of the evidence would be problematic for admissibility
because if the first responder did alter any information forensic analysis would be able to identify and
account for any of these changes.
3.2.3 Issues surrounding communication and training
Training was widely identified as a problem area within this study. Two of the most candid
interviewees were F4 and HB1 and their perspectives on the subject of training were very interesting.
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F4 identified many weaknesses in the field of digital security within his organization and, as he is
relatively new to the organization, he has been tasked with rectifying these issues. The difficulty, from
his perspective, is that the organization has fallen far behind in its process of reviewing company
policies and this is the first review conducted since the policies were written seven years ago; creating
an immensely difficult task. The only communication, at present, of policies and digital security
training is a Computer Based Training (CBT) scheme which forms part of employees’ initial induction
– there is no follow up training.
Furthermore, although policies and procedures can be accessed electronically after this initial
induction, most of the staff, according to F4, do not know this capability exists and subsequently do
not seek access to them. He explains that there are hard-copies of the policies distributed to each
manager, but “I suspect most of them end up in a cupboard”.
HB1 identified an ongoing battle with staff regarding information security training. She highlighted
that although the organization as a whole has agreed to annual information governance training,
individual staff have not taken this up and, as mentioned in 4.1, the staff must understand the issues in
order to heighten their awareness. This breakdown in communication will be discussed further later in
the paper. HB1 explained that their health board also has a CBT scheme in place for training which
has become outdated to the point of redundancy. She explained that the boost in their training
numbers can be credited to the Personal Development Programs (PDPs) in their health board whereby
staff must meet certain personal targets for training amongst other aspects of their role in order to
progress up their pay-band. This is the theory of behavioral economics where an individual’s internal
desire to achieve something is driven by monetary rewards [1]. Although this theory is criticized for
driving individuals by non-altruistic goals, HB1 concedes that she is “quite happy to use this system if
it means training improves”.
Beyond the scope of training, another recurrent theme about communication was salesmanship. HB1,
A1 and F4 all discussed the notion that, as a department, you have to sell your ideals to other
departments in order for them to recognize your cause. HB1 and A1 both described instances where
they would give lunchtime seminars or take part in other departmental meetings in order to highlight
the importance of digital security. F4 discussed it in a much more business sense:
“At the moment, I don’t think we are selling the benefits well enough and, therefore, it gets
ignored. But it’s down to us to sell the benefits because we can’t just expect to say ‘you should do
it. It’s a good idea’ and not say well hang on, this is what you’re going to get for your money.
Everything comes down to money and we have to justify our existence.”
This pragmatic attitude was somewhat refreshing regarding the literature around this subject, such as
the example of Harley’s phishing article, outlined in section 2.2, which seemed to expect something
from users simply because he tells them to expect something [3]. As identified, Harley’s approach
does not take into account different skill levels of users whereas F4 wants to make people understand
why digital security is a pertinent issue rather than simply imposing his views upon them. It could be
argued that although the literature is often too idealized in its suggestions of best practices, the
implementation can sometimes be more pragmatic.
3.2.4 Variables identified by the organizations that act as unique difficulties or points of note
At the end of the formal interview questions, interviewees were asked to raise any issues that they felt
were unique to their organization or that were prevalent in the current climate that had not yet been
raised. Although the issues raised during this section were not directly related to first response
discovery or the underlying training issues, very diverse problems were identified.
Because F3, F2 and F1 were all from financial institutions, their responses were similar
acknowledging that problems are fairly uniform throughout the financial world. These included the
lack of mandatory training and education as well as risk assessing the organization from a variety of
levels and vantage points. Interestingly, F1 identified the organized crime aspect to be a large problem
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facing all types of organizations.
HB1 and HB2 both identified patient care as the unique aspect of their health board over other types of
organizations. HB1 highlighted that:
“Everything we do will potentially affect the patients and if someone isn’t doing what they’re
meant to electronically, they could kill somebody.”
HB2 elaborated upon this point by highlighting the reputational aspect of their health board versus
organizations. He indicates that one of the worst outcomes for a corporate organization is reputational
damage, whereas within a health care situation there are lives at stake. Furthermore, their health
board’s reputation is arguably more valuable than an organization because for many people there is no
alternative. He notes that if a company’s reputation is damaged, the customers have the option of
moving elsewhere. Other than private medical care, there is no alternative to their health board. HB1
concurs, explaining that within her specific health board “we have to be whiter than white”.
F4 states that the problematic area for his particular organization is their relative infancy within the
financial sector. He explains that the organization is only beginning to push branding of the company
and his concerns lie in the raised profile of the company outweighing the security measures to prevent
attacks:
“If we raise our profile as a brand someone will start looking at us and saying well what’s going
on here and what can we get from these people?”
This was not raised specifically as an issue, but perhaps his concerns are more relevant given the
current financial climate and the desperation of people to have enough money to survive. He goes on
to say that it would have been nice if both brand profile and brand protection had developed in parallel
rather than one being required to catch up.
A1’s unique aspect of the academic organization stemmed from the diverse nature of the staff,
students and their requirements. Web filtering, for example, is a limited security measure within the
University as there is no way to predict what topical areas students and staff will be researching at any
particular time. He comments on the financial ties relating to this situation. Often, research grants will
be awarded only if the researcher can provide proof that the institution is equipped to allow the
research to be conducted. This may involve reducing security measures for particular parts of the
University or taking specific computers off the network. He also comments that mandating anything
within the University, such as training and education is extremely difficult as academia takes priority
over all else.
This lack of standardization and mandating is prevalent within the law enforcement side also,
according to DE1. He comments that varied approaches to the handling of digital evidence by different
police forces and organizations can make it difficult to work as an independent outsourcing company
as different clientele will require information to be presented in a variety of formats. This is definitely
a recurring theme within the field of digital security regardless of whether one is implementing it or
handling the aftermath.
Although not a unique aspect of his position, CS1 explains that he has recently been told about a
police force in Holland that is training all their Criminal Investigation Department (CID) police to
handle digital evidence in a forensically sound manner. According to CS1, the problems surrounding
digital devices has become so prevalent and widespread that they are ensuring that all their detectives
have a basic understanding of how to handle the devices and will pass on particularly difficult cases to
experts. He described it as ‘triaging’ the computers and this was also a phrase used by HB1 in a
discussion of outsourcing versus handling information internally.
4. DIGITAL FORENSIC PRACTICE (DFP) RECOMMENDATIONS
An analysis of the results generated from the interview process, as well as studying current literature,
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provided three recommendations that organizations should consider when dealing with digital
evidence. Beyond these three recommendations there are too many variations within organizational
structure and the unique problems faced by different types of organizations as demonstrated in section
3.2.4 for formal restrictions to be productive. These recommendations provide a solid basis for
evidence to be handled at the discovery stage in order to assist the preservation of evidence integrity.
The three recommendations are as follows:
1. Do not use the intranet for policies regarding the handling of digital evidence.
2. Have a centralized co-ordination point so staff members are clear on who should be contacted.
3. Use an external company to perform forensic analysis but have internal ‘triaging’ capabilities.
4.1 Do not use the intranet for policies regarding the handling of digital evidence
Many of the organizations used the intranet as a communication point for staff should they need to
refer back to policies at a post-training stage, as mentioned in Section 3.2.2 Current first responder
practices. Although this approach, for the most part, is a sensible measure to ensure the ability staff to
be able to access policies at all times. For the purpose of handling digital evidence, it is unacceptable.
After the point of evidence discovery, the staff member should be able to access the information
required without asking anyone or touching the suspect computer. In terms of asking anyone, this is
not recommended as it may not be clear who has perpetrated the crime and giving warning to
individuals within the office may compromise the evidence. F3 highlighted an incident that had
occurred involving a laptop whereby the individual owning the laptop had been warned ahead of time
that it would be investigated. This allowed the individual to delete information from it and although
this was subsequently recovered the potential for affecting the admissibility existed. Although
interaction with other individuals could be counterproductive within an investigation, the primary
concern would be those in the immediate vicinity of discovery and, therefore, providing staff with a
centralized “help” facility would allow explanation of protocol, within minimised risk, to the digital
evidence. This is discussed in Section 4.2. A hard copy of policies should also be accessible to all staff
members as supplementary, supporting and verification materials, as initial training can be easily
forgotten after the fact. These facilities should be available to every employee regardless of whether an
incident is likely to occur within their job as anyone can be a first responder to an incident.
4.2 Have a centralized co-ordination point so staff members are clear on who should be
contacted
Although this may incur cost to the company, Section 3.2.2 Current first responder practices
demonstrated the range of responses by interviewees when asked who a first responder should contact
in instances of evidence discovery. Having a centralized point acting as a call centre for coordination
will assist in the implementation of the first recommendation.
All that would be required is a card or sticker attached to every terminal or laptop in the company and
first responders would have access to the appropriate information rather than having to consult the
intranet.
4.3 Use an external company to perform forensic analysis but have internal ‘triaging’
capabilities
F3 and HB1 noted that it is sensible to handle forensic analysis externally to avoid any potential
corruption or to prevent people from not reporting issues to protect friends or colleagues. This is a
very sensible idea but, in line with CS1’s information about the Dutch police, internal ‘triaging’
capabilities are essential to an organization. Although those interviewees who noted outsourcing as a
company policy said they used local companies to ensure they were on the scene quickly, there will
still be a time lapse between discovery and the arrival of an outsourcing team. Having staff members
on site who can secure and handle the device at this interim point would prove invaluable to an
organization when issues of admissibility are raised. Larger organizations may have dedicated

42

ADFSL Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law, 2010
departments that deal with digital investigations; however, a contingency of outsourcing would be
beneficial should an incident arise where the investigative department itself requires examination.
Arguably, this recommendation could be split into two issues. The first addresses the use of external
forensic companies and the second has the responsibility of internal ‘triaging’. However, given that
there will be a natural time-lapse between discovery, reporting the incident and the external company
arriving on the scene. Having the plan for handling the evidence between these time-lapses is
fundamental in ensuring the continuity of evidence. Based on the outcome of this research, ‘triaging’
capabilities would be recommended for every organization. Although interviewees indicated that their
external contractors would endeavor to be on-scene at the earlier point, there are limitations as to how
quickly this would occur and the data has the potential to change within this time.
5. CONCLUSION
The continued integration of the digital data into business environments highlights the need for
organizations and law enforcement to be able to handle digital evidence from a first responder
perspective. A lack of digital forensics practices and procedures cultivates an environment that is
conducive to compromising evidence in organizations. This research attempts to identify areas within
organizations where the provisions for first responder evidence handling are not at an acceptable level
to guarantee the admissibility of items of evidentiary value.
The conclusions derived from the survey resulted in the creation of DFP recommendations. The
implementation of these recommendations should assist in the mitigation of inadmissible evidence.
The DFP recommendations are as follows:
1. Do not use the intranet for policies regarding the handling of digital evidence.
2. Have a centralized co-ordination point so staff members are clear on who should be contacted.
3. Use (or plan for) external companies to perform forensic analysis but have internal ‘triaging’
capabilities.
Future research should investigate higher level staff members who are responsible for dictating the
culture of the organization and setting the budgets which ultimately shape the implemented digital
forensic strategies.
Furthermore, it would be interesting to broaden the research scope to include private companies. This
is due to the limited financial scope of the current research which perhaps masks a fuller
understanding of the bigger picture. It would also make a noteworthy addition to future research to
consider businesses that are purely internet based to determine if they face the same problems. In
addition, it would be beneficial to investigate companies that operate within a technological field
rather than those simply using technology within the course of their business
Additional research would also benefit from an examination of the front-end or lower-level staff’s
perspective to verify whether the assessment made, by higher level interviewees, of their ability to
cope with discovering evidence was accurate. The scope of the research could also be expanded to
incorporate the business issues involved in implementing security matters such as cost risk analysis
and management issues.
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